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1 Introduction/Abstract
Epistemic modality involves contextual dependencies in discourse of at least two
kinds (Roberts 1989; Veltman 1996). We characterize them with the slogans:
I Epistemic modal facts are asymmetrically dependent on non modal facts.
II Some modal facts are dependent on other modal facts.
We show that they have a natural treatment within a continuation style semantics.
The first contextual dependency is on display in Veltman’s (1996) examples:
(1) It might be sunny. But it’s not sunny
(2) # It’s not sunny. But it might (for all I know) be sunny.
For Veltman, there is a subtle but unmistakable difference between (1) and (2). The
first involves a smooth discourse update, whereas the second does not. The non
modal facts established in prior discourse constrain the set of epistemic possibilities:
if the discourse context contains a non modal fact that p, it does not felicitously
admit a continuation with the epistemic possibility that ¬p. The converse, however,
does not hold: if the discourse context contains a modal fact that p, it may admit a
felicitous continuation that establishes the non modal fact that p.
The phenomenon known as modal subordination (MS) exemplifies the second
dependency of epistemic modalities. MS involves anaphoric links between pronouns
and their antecedents across modalities like those in (3) and (4) from (Roberts 1989).
Standard versions of dynamic semantics (Kamp 1981) do not predict these links.
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(3) A wolf might enter. It would growl.
(4) A wolf might enter. #It will growl.
(5) A wolf enters. ?It would growl.
Previous accounts of dependencies (I) and (II) have exploited DRT or other
dynamic frameworks (Roberts 1989; Veltman 1996; Frank & Kamp 1997; Stone
& Hardt 1997). We extend the Montagovian continuation semantics of Philippe
de Groote (2006), to provide a modular treatment of both MS and V. We embed
dynamic modal logics within a classical setting, where quantifiers, modal operators
and variables receive their standard interpretation and assignments and discourse
referents are not semantic objects in the models, as they are in most other analyses.
2 An introduction to continuation semantics
Most versions of dynamic semantics (DS) in linguistics make heavy use of as-
signment functions as semantic objects. While this may not be apparent to the
casual reader of early work like (Kamp 1981), a compositional semantics for DRT,
DPL (Groenendijk & Stokhof 1991) or more recent developments (Brasoeavnu 2008)
leads almost inevitably to the introduction of “odd” types whose inhabitants are vari-
ables, assignments or other “representational” elements. Dynamic Intensional Logic
(DIL) (Groenendijk & Stokhof 1996; Dekker 1999), following Janssen (1983)’s
work on programming languages, has the virtue of making central the semantic
status of assignment functions, as they are the points of evaluation in that model
theory. But almost all of extant versions of DS include assignment functions as parts
of semantic values. The exploitation of assignment functions as semantic objects
plays a crucial role in many dynamic semantics approaches to modal subordination
and intensionality (Frank & Kamp 1997; Asher & McCready 2007). This engenders
subtle differences in the underlying logic, clouding the logical status of discourse
referents in a “top” DRS by making them appear ambiguous between existentially
bound variables and free ones (cf. (Fernando 1994)). It also leads to problems of
destructive assignment in DPL and with variable clash in DRT or versions of DPL
that use partial assignment functions. It is difficult to avoid these problems in a
purely compositional environment, leading to cumbersome systems.
Continuation style semantics (CS) developed by computer scientists in the 70s
and introduced into linguistics by Barker (2004); Shan & Barker (2006); Philippe
de Groote (2006); Bernardi & Moortgat (2010) avoid these problems. CS provides a
more abstract setting for dynamic logics, abstracting away from assignments that
are essential to the formulations of DIL, DPL and DRT. CS, like DS, models the
dynamic meaning of a natural language expression as a transition between a left
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context and a right one. But in CS right contexts are explicitly introduced and are
defined in terms of left contexts and sentence denotations. CS exploits the structure
of a monad in category theory (Moggi 1991), which specifies the parameters needed
to provide a CS: the first is to specify what a left context is; the second is to provide
a “binder” rule, which tells us how to combine the semantics of a text with that of
subsequent sentence; the third is to specify the lexical entries for expressions. CS
thus refocuses semanticists’ attention on specifying appropriate lexical entries and
discourse contexts. CS permits a wide variety of choices as to what left contexts,
binder rules and lexical entries are, a liberalism we exploit below.
As an example, consider Philippe de Groote’s (2006) CS. de Groote exploits
Montague’s homomorphic interpretation of syntactic types and structures into se-
mantic types and terms. But Philippe de Groote (2006) changes Montague’s inter-
pretation JsK of the sentence type s from t to: Ω
∆
= γ → (γ → t)→ t, where γ is the
type of the left context or discourse context already given and γ → t is the type of the
right context or discourse “to come”—its continuation. If this sentence introduces
a new discourse entity x, given an environment i (as input) and a continuation k as
parameter, it can provide (x :: i) (with · :: · a list constructor of type e → γ → γ) as
parameter to k, making the value of x available for k.
Other types have standard interpretations. Where JXK stands for the λ -term
or meaning of X , JnpK = (e → JsK)→ JsK and JnK = e → JsK. Pronouns have the
following interpretation: JitK = λP.λ ik.P(s❡❧ i) i k, where i : γ,k : γ → t, and where
s❡❧ i is a function that selects a suitable discourse antecedent inside i.
A CS like Philippe de Groote’s (2006)’s must say how a text T combines with
a sentence to its right. This is the CS binder issue, which is also an essential part
of all dynamical systems—it is the DRS update operation of DRT or relational
composition of sentence contents in DPL. Here is the basic binder equation for
de Groote’s system and ours:
(6) JT.SK = λ i.λk.JT K i (λ i′.JSK i′ k)
That is, the text to date T takes the meaning of S as its right context, or rather the
meaning of S suitably applied and abstracted so that it can be of t type. A quick type
check on λ i′.JSK i′ k confirms that this is indeed the right output: JSK : γ → (γ →
t)→ t so λ i′.JSK i′ k : γ → t.
Let’s look at a sample discourse to see how the theory works.
(7) A man is sleeping. He is snoring.
Suitable lexical entries provide a completely classical interpretation of these two
sentences except that they have both a left and right context and that the second
sentence fills in the right context of the first. The entries also make the existential
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determiner introduce an individual into the right context—a witness that will be
“selected” by the pronoun. With this in mind, the interpretations of the first and
second sentences are:
λ i.λk.∃x. (man x)∧ (sleeping x)∧ (k (x :: i)) λ i.λk.(snoring (s❡❧ i))∧ (k i)
Using the binder rule in (6), these last two λ terms yield a meaning for (7) :
λ i k.([λ i k.∃x.(man x)∧ (sleeping x)∧ k (x :: i)] i)
(λ i′.(λ i k.(snoring (s❡❧ i))∧ (k i)) i′ k)
→β λ i k.[λk.∃x.(man x)∧ (sleeping x)∧ (k (x :: i))]
(λ i′.(snoring (s❡❧ i′))∧ (k i′))
→β λ i k.[∃x.(man x)∧ (sleeping x)∧ ((λ i
′.(snoring (s❡❧ i′))∧ (k i′)) (x :: i))]
→β λ i k.[∃x.(man x)∧ (sleeping x)∧ ((snoring (s❡❧ (x :: i))∧ (k (x :: i))))]
In selecting the bound variable x, the semantic value of the anaphoric pronoun falls
within the scope of the original existential quantifier, reducing anaphoric binding to
quantificational binding.
We briefly compare de Groote’s CS to DIL.1 The points of evaluation in models
for DIL are not worlds but assignments of values to variables. Sentences have the
type: (s → t)→ t, where s is the type of states (assignments). Crucial to DIL’s
account of intersentential anaphora are the modalities, 〈x/d〉, where d identifies an
assignment. 〈x/d〉φ evaluates φ relative to an assignment in which the value of d =
the value of x in the current state. In DIL, quantification over x in 〈x/d〉φ provides
dynamic binding, and as Dekker (1999) emphasizes:
(8) λ p.∃x.〈x/d〉∨p[∧Ud]→β ∃x.Ux
Like CS, DIL uses a binder rule to build text meanings:
(9) JT K.JSK = λ p(JT K(∧JSK(p))
Returning to (7), DIL provides the following logical forms for the two sentences.
(10) λ p.∃x〈x/d〉.(man x)∧ (sleeping x)∧∨ p) λ p.snoring (d)∧∨ p)
Exploiting (8), the translations (10), together with (9), now yield for (7):
(11) λ p.∃x.(man x)∧ (sleeping x)∧ snoring (d)∧∨ p)
1 DIL’s Montagovian nature facilitates the comparison, but we could have illustrated our points with
other versions of DS.
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The DIL derivation capitalizes on the reduction properties of state switcher
〈x/d〉 and crucially depends on DIL’s unorthodox "worlds", which are assignments.
This is quite different from de Groote’s CS, whose model theory and logic are
completely classical. The left context list structure builds in effect assignment
functions internally, via the interpretation of update operator :: and captures the
structure of an assignment function without postulating any as basic objects in the
model theory.2 Notice that this simplification comes about simply by a “distribution
of labor”: the binder rule in Philippe de Groote (2006) is more complex than that of
DIL as are the lexical entries. But the payoff is a logical framework that is just that
of standard logic.
3 Modality
3.1 Veltman’s Test
In this section, we address our first slogan, which encapsulates the context depen-
dency of epistemic modality upon the non modal facts taken to be common ground
in the discourse. This intuition has proved useful in a number of areas of semantics
and epistemology. For instance, it yields a simple formulation of the Ramsey test
semantics for conditionals. It was Frank Veltman who brought this feature of modals
into contemporary discussions of epistemic modality with the examples we repeat
below:
(12) It might be sunny. But it’s not sunny.
(13) # It’s not sunny. But it might (for all I know) be sunny.
Veltman observes that (12) involves a smooth discourse update, whereas the second
does not. To account for his observation, he builds a semantics for a propositional
modal language in which all sentences define an update function on an information
state, which is modelled as a set of worlds or epistemic possibilities. The information
state evolves as discourse proceeds. All non modal sentences φ have a particularly
simple update [φ ]: (s[φ ]) = {w ∈ s : w ∈ ‖φ‖}. Modal sentences, however, involve
tests on the information state. For a sentence of the form ♦φ , we have:3
(14) s[♦φ ] = s iff ∃w ∈ s w ∈ ‖φ‖
Veltman’s dynamic semantics is of a very different style from DRT or DPL,
where sentences define dynamic transitions over assignment functions or world
2 The semantics would work just as well, if instead of lists, we had used sets of objects as left contexts.
3 We define a Ramsey test semantics for conditionals, according to which a conditional φ ⇒ ψ is true
just in case updating ones information state with φ and then with ψ is equivalent to updating just
with φ , as follows for a propositional language:s[φ ⇒ ψ] = s iff s[φ ][ψ] = s[φ ]
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assignment function pairs. Philippe de Groote’s CS picks a notion of left context
appropriate for modelling DRT or DPL; but to recreate the sort of test behavior by
modals in Veltman’s semantics, we need to have a different notion of left context. As
we said in the previous section, however, one of the principal virtues of a continuation
style semantics is that a left context can in principle be any sort of data structure
without changing the basic set up of the semantics; this is a feature that we exploit
here in modelling Veltman’s observations within CS. We will take a left context to
be a theory or collection of sentences; this theory models the information state and
will evolve as discourse proceeds, just as the information state does for Veltman. We
will then formulate the semantics of modals using a notion of a test on such a state
to capture the behavior that Veltman noticed.
3.1.1 Veltman modalities within continuation semantics
In this section we provide a Veltman-inspired CS for a propositional modal language
L, containing propositional variables, ¬,∧, and ♦. To incorporate the notion of a
test, modals of the form ♦φ permit a continuation when the modal context i1 is such
that i1∩‖φ‖ 6= 0. This is a presupposition that the incoming context must meet. If
the presupposition is satisfied, then the update is defined and discourse processing
can proceed. If the discourse context does not satisfy the presupposition, there is no
accommodation and no further updating is possible.
Veltman’s idea of a test treats the semantic value of a formula as something other
than a simple truth value. Thus, our type of proposition must reflect this; it will
no longer be t, as in extensional versions of Montague grammar but rather some
intensional type, which we will call here ♣r♦♣. We consider left contexts to be a
theory, of type ❚❤❡♦r②, giving the content of the discourse context (this could be a
single formula or a set of formulas). Just as in (Philippe de Groote 2006), we also
need the :: operator that updates the left context within information from the formula
under consideration. The basic types of our variables i (for left contexts), k (for right
contexts) and :: (for our update function) are:
i : γ
∆
= ❚❤❡♦r② k : ❚❤❡♦r②→ t :: : ♣r♦♣→ ❚❤❡♦r②→ ❚❤❡♦r②
We also have an exception ❍❛❧t that when raised stops the evaluation, and a ❚❊❙❚
operation that we define presently. We now define the dynamic variants of the
propositional connectives and modal operator, with a canonical injection from the
static to the dynamic case. The basic λ -terms of this language are:
• for an atomic static formulas p of type t: λ i k.p∧ (k (p :: i));
• for P a dynamic proposition (of type Ω
∆
= γ → (γ → t)→ t)), we define (with
T
∆
= λ i.⊤ the trivial continuation):
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– the dynamic negation ¬d
∆
= λP.λ i k.(¬(P iT))∧ (k ((¬P i T) :: i));
– the dynamic conjunction: ∧d
∆
= λP Q.λ i k.P i (λ i′.Q i′ k);
– the dynamic modality ♦d
∆
= λP.λ i k.(❚❊❙❚ P) i (λ i′.(k i′)∧(♦(P i′ T)))
where ♦ is the classic static modality.
To define ❚❊❙❚, we need to evaluate the consistency of the claim under the scope
of the modal with the incoming context. We use an evaluation function ❊❱❆▲ from
propositions to truth values, which we define in terms of consistency or general
satisfiability (relative to any model).4
(15) ❚❊❙❚ P = λ i k.✐❢ (❊❱❆▲ P i T) t❤❡♥ (k i) ❡❧s❡ (r❛✐s❡ ❍❛❧t)
♦d yields a continuation iff there is at least one world that verifies all the in-
formation in the discourse context together with the content under the scope of the
modal. If not it raises an exception ❍❛❧t, whose effect is to stop the evaluation.
This captures Veltman’s intuition that there is no possible continuation in this case.
This use of exceptions resembles de Groote & Lebedeva’s (2010) use of exceptions
for presupposition accomodation. This is no surprise; Veltman’s might exhibits
presuppositional behavior, but with no possibility of accommodation.
This set up makes the same predictions that Veltman’s semantics does for simple
modal sentences, assuming the standard combination rule (which actually is ∧d).
We illustrate with (12). Beginning with the empty input context ❡♠♣t② and updating
with ’It might be sunny’ (♦dS with S = λ i k.sunny∧ (k (sunny :: i))) we get a
continuation because it is consistent to assume S (and indeed any propositional
letter), that is ❊❱❆▲ S ❡♠♣t② T=⊤.
(♦dS) ❡♠♣t②→β λk.(❚❊❙❚ S) ❡♠♣t② (λ i
′.(k i′)∧ (♦(S i′ T)))
→β k ❡♠♣t②
Integrating this with ’not sunny’ or λ i k.(¬sunny)∧ (k ((¬sunny) :: i)) using (6)
will then restrict future continuations to having a discourse context in which it is not
sunny as a left context. But reversing the order of these sentences gives us a different
result. Updating first with ¬dS, gives us a discourse context such that attempting
to update with ♦dS will lead the ❚❊❙❚ to raise ❍❛❧t because the current theory to
4 We could also define ❊❱❆▲ relative to a particular model as does Veltman. But if the fixed model is
somehow deficient (doesn’t for instance contain enough epistemic possibilities), the Test procedure
may produce funny results. While one can stipulate a full model in cases where canonical model
constructions are possible, this is not always possible. Our conception of ❊❱❆▲ does not have this
limitation.
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be tested will contain both ¬sunny and sunny which makes it unsatisfiable. This
yields no continuations, and no further informative updates are possible. We thus
predict that the discourse is malformed. Veltman’s account of update to test and its
consequence are straightforwardly captured in this CS.
3.2 Modal Subordination
We turn now to our CS analysis of the interdependence of modal facts and MS.
Treating modality as a standard Kripke operator in DRT makes bad predictions:
(16) A wolf might walk in. It would growl.
(17) A wolf might walk in. It *will growl
(18) A wolf is outside. He might growl.
DRT predicts (17) to be bad and (18) to be good, as intuitions warrant. But it also
predicts (16) is bad. A straightforward analysis of modality in DRT produces two
subDRSs in the main DRS, making the discourse referents introduced under the
scope of one modal inaccessible to anaphoric conditions in the main DRS, or to
conditions inside the scope of the second model. This yields bad results.
To address this problem, Roberts (1989) treats and ♦ as generalized quantifiers
whose unspecified restrictors can be accommodated in the context. φ is in fact:
(?,φ), with ? a modal base to be filled in the context using a proposition within
the scope of an appropriate modal.
In (Roberts 1989), (16) yields the DRS (using the standard linear notation):
(19) ♦(?, [x | wolf x . . .])∧([[x | x(wolf x . . .], [ | growl x]])
Roberts’s account doesn’t specify a direct anaphoric link between the pronoun and
the linguistically given antecedent in its own modal context. The discourse referent
x introduced by the first sentence remains inaccessible to the pronoun introduced in
the second. But there is an inferential link added between the linguistic antecedent
in the first sentence and the pronoun; the second sentence in fact quantifies over
all elements in the appropriate domain that have the property specified by the first
sentence, and thus we can infer that whatever the witness for x in the first DRS, it
will growl in every relevant epistemic possibility.
(Geurts 1996; Frank 1996) criticize Roberts’s account as being too unconstrained.
They postulate a direct anaphoric link at the level of sentence contents between the
restrictor of the second modality and the material in the nuclear scope of the first
modality. The value assigned to x in the first sentence is linked to its interpretation
of the second sentence in (Frank & Kamp 1997) because the assignments to x are
encoded in the semantic value (the dynamic intension) of the material under the
8
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scope of the ♦ and hence in the restrictor of the would modality. This strategy shows
that the discourse referent x is not functioning as an existentially quantified variable.
But in (Frank & Kamp 1997) the would modality disappears into the condi-
tional ⇒. They generate a very weak modal logic, and their account is still too
unconstrained (Asher & McCready 2007). Finally, (20) shows that a straightforward
interpretation of the modal structures above leads to trouble.
(20) A wolf might walk in. He would growl. A second wolf might then walk in,
but he wouldn’t growl.
If the would modality is understood as a simple universal quantification over all
wolves that walk in, this discourse is predicted to be contradictory, but it isn’t. This
is a clearly problem for Roberts’ account. Frank and Kamp interpret the would
modality relative to all those normal epistemic possibilities satisfying the antecedent,
and this may permit them to avoid the prediction. But this wiggle room also further
weakens the account’s predictions—for instance, among those epistemic possibilities
validating (16), there may be epistemic possibilities where the wolf doesn’t growl,
contrary to intuitions.
3.2.1 The Modal Context
We first show how to make a modal context accessible to further modalized continu-
ations. We interpret sentences and discourse as described in (21), together with the
sentence combination rule of (22). Table 1 then introduces the standard dynamic
lexicon we use. This lexicon uses the following notational convention: syntactic
constituents (basically trees in this paper) are represented as cword, to be read as
word. A sentence such as a wolf might enter is represented by its syntactic tree
cmight center (ca cwolf ). The latter shows the application rules to be considered in
compositionally computing the semantic representation.
JsK = γ → (γ → t)→ t
∆
= Ω(21)
JS1.S2K = λ ik.JS1K i(λ i
′.S2 i
′ k) : Ω(22)
In order to deal with modalities, we introduce the interpretation for might as
in (23)5. The effect is simply to put the content,the quantifiers and the predicates,
under the scope of the modal operators.
JcmightK = λvs.λ i k.♦(vs ik) JcwouldK = λvs.λ i k.(vs ik)(23)
5 This interpretation results in readings where modalities have scope over existentials. The interpretation
Jc′mightK = λvs.λ i k.vs i(λ i
′.♦(k i′)) gives existentials having scope over modals.
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JcenterK = λ s.s(λx ik.(enterx)∧ (k i)) Jcwolf K = λx ik.(wolfx)∧ (k i)
JcgrowlK = λ s.s(λx ik.(growlx)∧ (k i)) JcitK = λPik.P(s❡❧ i) i k
JcaK = λPQ.λ i k.∃x.Px(x :: i)(λ i
′.Qxi′ k)
Table 1 Basic dynamic lexicon
Then, with t0 = cmight center (ca cwolf ) and t1 = cwould cgrowl cit t0.t1 represents (16) and
we get:
Jt0K = λ i k.♦(∃x.(wolfx)∧ ((enterx)∧ (k (x :: i))))
Jt1K = λ i k.((growl(s❡❧ i))∧ (k i))
Jt0 . t1K = λ i k.♦(∃x.(wolfx)∧ ((enterx)
∧(((growl(s❡❧(x :: i)))∧ (k (x :: i))))))
Our lexical entries also have the effect of embedding one modality within the other,
making discourse referents (here the wolf x) accessible for further modal continuation
such as it would growl. The first sentence makes this discourse referent explicitly
available in the environment (x :: i) of the next sentences.
This is not completely satisfactory because it entails that from a world where
a wolf x enters the room, all the accessible worlds verify that x is growling. But x
might be a tiger in one of these worlds; such worlds should not affect the evaluation
of the would claim. Below we introduce a modal base that restricts the epistemically
relevant worlds in the right way.
3.2.2 Introducing the Modal Base
In section 3.1, we specified the atomic type γ of the context as a theory, and in
section 2, we made γ a list structure, with the attendant update function ::: e→ γ → γ
and access function s❡❧ : γ → e. We now combine these two ideas by considering γ
as a record:
(24) γ = {♠❴r❡❢ : γ ′; ❜❛s❡ : t}
where γ ′ provides a set of entities while the ❜❛s❡ field contains the current modal base.
We overload the following functions using the previously defined ones:
x ::b i = {♠❴r❡❢ = x :: (i.♠❴r❡❢); ❜❛s❡ = i.❜❛s❡}(25)
s❡❧b i = s❡❧(i.♠❴r❡❢)(26)
p∧b i = {♠❴r❡❢ = (i.♠❴r❡❢); ❜❛s❡ = p∧ (i.❜❛s❡)}(27)
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and get the lexicon of Table 2. Neither the definition of the Ω type nor the sentence
combination rule change. But standard lexical entries now can add to the modal base
(the k continuations are fed with (pred∧b i) parameters) and the lexical entry for
might explicitly uses the current modal base i.❜❛s❡. The main operator for computing
the new modal base is conjunction. However, nothing prevents us from having
more complex computations such as various kinds of inference in order to take into
account Roberts’s analysis of counterfactuals, which exploits consistency relations.
JcenterK = λ s.s(λx ik.(enterx)∧ (k ((enterx)∧b i)))
JcgrowlK = λ s.s(λx ik.(growlx)∧ (k ((growlx)∧b i)))
JcaK = λPQ.λ i k.∃x.Px(x :: i)(λ i
′.Qxi′ k)
Jcwolf K = λx ik.(wolfx)∧ (k ((wolfx)∧b i))
JcitK = λPik.P(s❡❧b i) i k JcmightK = λvs.λ i k.♦(i.❜❛s❡⇒ vs ik)
Table 2 Modal context and modal base
Our lexical entries6 together with our binder rule in (6) provide the following
derivation for the basic example of MS7:
Jcmight centerK = λ s.λ i k.♦(i.❜❛s❡⇒ s(λx ik.(enterx)∧ (k ((enterx)∧b i))))
Jca cwolf K = λQik.∃x.(wolfx)∧ (Qx(wolfx)∧b (x ::b i))k
Jt0K = λ i k.♦(i.❜❛s❡⇒∃x.(wolfx)∧ ((enterx)
∧ (k ((enterx)∧b (wolfx)∧b (x ::b i)))))
Jt1K = λ i k.(i.❜❛s❡⇒ (growl(s❡❧b i))∧ (k ((growl(s❡❧b i))∧b i)))
so that
Jt0 . t1K = λ ik.(♦(i.❜❛s❡⇒∃x.(wolfx)∧ ((enterx)
∧ ((((enterx)∧b (wolfx)∧b (x ::b i))).❜❛s❡⇒ (growl(s❡❧b (x ::b i)))
∧ (k ((growl(s❡❧(x :: i.♠❴r❡❢)))∧b ((enterx)∧b (wolfx)∧b (x ::b i))))))))
Then with ❡♠♣t②= {♠❴r❡❢= ♥✐❧; ❜❛s❡=⊤} andT=(λ i.⊤), the empty parameters
6 A better interpretation for cit would be λPik.❧❡t x = s❡❧b i ✐♥ Pxio to ensure that the selected
element remains the same in the modal base and in the modal claim, as the derivations below show.
For simplicity, we don’t do this here but we assume that the same element is selected in both places
without loss of generality.
7 We use the facts that (p∧b (x ::b i)).❜❛s❡= p∧ i.❜❛s❡ and that (p∧b (x ::b i)).♠❴r❡❢= x :: i.♠❴r❡❢.
11
N. Asher, S. Pogodalla
for starting a discourse, we get
Jt0 . t1K❡♠♣t②T= ♦(⊤⇒ ∃x.(wolfx)∧ ((enterx)
∧ ((((enterx)∧ (wolfx))⇒ (growl(s❡❧((x :: ♥✐❧))))))))
Our lexical entries again yield logical forms in which the would claim is embed-
ded under the might claim, allowing us to link the anaphoric pronoun via binding to
its antecedent using a bound variable, in contrast to (Roberts 1989). To make the 
claims also hold of the relevant possibilities selected by the might sentence, however,
we require a condition on our model theoretic structures: we need an alternativeness
relation for the epistemic modality, which is at least secondarily reflexive so that
the  claims also hold of the relevant possibilities selected by the might sentence.
One might wonder whether the  needs to be evaluated in the actual world too;
we evaluate it only at those worlds picked out by the might claim. To have the
effect of the would claim holding of all epistemic possibilities, we must stipulate the
alternativeness relation to be Euclidean.
CS is flexible enough to allow other lexical entries inducing a wide scope reading
for the existential over the modalities and with the modalities unembedded. This
permits again a bound variable analysis of the anaphoric link across might and
would claims. CS allows us to discuss various interpretations without changing the
theoretical framework: we interpret formulas in the standard model theory of modal
logic; it is then a matter of lexical semantics to achieve the desired effects.
3.2.3 Interactions Between Actual and Modal Contexts
To integrate interactions between factual and modal information, we extend our
records, our representations of the left context in the previous section, to include the
factual information within the left context. We do this by adding a new field ❢❴r❡❢ to
the record that will contain discourse referents introduced in the factual world:
(28) γ = {♠❴r❡❢ : γ ′; ❜❛s❡ : t; ❢❴r❡❢ : γ ′}
Actually, we need this type to be a little bit more complex. It must contain another
field encoding the current mode of the sentence so that indefinites will be able to add
the introduced variables in ♠❴r❡❢ when in a modal context ({♠❴r❡❢= x :: i.♠❴r❡❢; ❢❴r❡❢=
i.❢❴r❡❢}) and in ❢❴r❡❢ when in the actual context ({♠❴r❡❢ = i.♠❴r❡❢; ❢❴r❡❢ = x :: i.❢❴r❡❢}).
The same holds for the pronoun that has to select either from the factually introduced
referents (s❡❧ i.❢❴r❡❢) when in the factual mood or from the union of the factually
and modally introduced referents (s❡❧ i.♠❴r❡❢∪ i.❢❴r❡❢) when in a modal mood. To
avoid expressing all the cases within our lexical semantics, we consider a modal
entry am and a factual entry a f for the indefinite a, a modal entry itm and a factual
entry it f for the pronoun, etc.
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Our CS now will use two continuations: one containing facts about the actual
world, one containing facts about live possibilities the discourse describes. Instead of
producing at the end the t type, sentences now produce a pair of claims: one for the
epistemic worlds, one for the factual world. We model the pair with the higher-order
type function of the type (t → t → t)→ t. It is important that the result itself is of
type t and not of type (t, t), because otherwise quantifiers would be introduced either
in the first projection or in the second projection and hence bound variables would
never be accessible to both components. But the variables introduced by factual DPs
have to be accessible to both components.
These changes induce a change in type for Ω:
JsK = γ → (γ → t)→ (γ → t)→ (t → t → t)→ t
∆
= Ω(29)
JcenterK= λ s.s(λx ik1k2 f . f ((enter x)∧ (k1 (enter x∧b i))) ((enter x)∧ (k2 i)))
Jcwolf K= λx i k1 k2 f . f ((wolf x)∧ (k1 (wolf x∧b i))) ((wolf x)∧ (k2 i))
Jcma K= λPQ.λ i k1 k2 f . f [∃x.Px{i ✇✐t❤ ♠❴r❡❢ = x :: i.♠❴r❡❢}
(λ i′.Qxi′ k1 k2 Π1) k2Π1] (k2 i)
Jc fa K= λPQ.λ i k1 k2 f .∃x. f [k1 {i ✇✐t❤ ❢❴r❡❢ = x :: i}]
[Px{i ✇✐t❤ ❢❴r❡❢ = x :: i}k1 (λ i
′.Qxi′ k1 k2Π2) Π2]
Jcmit K= λPik1 k2 f .P(s❡❧b i.♠❴r❡❢∪ i.❢❴r❡❢) i k1 k2 f
Jc
f
itK= λPik1 k2 f .P(s❡❧b i.❢❴r❡❢) i k1 k2 f
JcmightK= λvs.λ i k1 k2 f . f (♦(i.❜❛s❡⇒ (vs ik1 k2Π1))) (k2 i)
Table 3 Modal and factual contexts
Together with the lexical entries of Table 38, we get (with t2 = cwill cgrowl cit):
Jt0K = λ i k1 k2 f . f [♦(i.❜❛s❡⇒∃x.(wolf x)∧ ((enter x)
∧ (k1 {i ✇✐t❤ ♠❴r❡❢ = x :: i.♠❴r❡❢ ; ❜❛s❡ = (wolf x)∧ (enter x)∧ i.❜❛s❡})))]
[k2 i]
Jt1K = λ i k1 k2 f . f [(i.❜❛s❡⇒ ((growl (s❡❧ i.♠❴r❡❢∪ i.❢❴r❡❢))
∧ (k1 {i ✇✐t❤ ❜❛s❡ = (growl (s❡❧ i.♠❴r❡❢∪ i.❢❴r❡❢))∧ i.❜❛s❡})))] [k2 i]
Jt2K = λ i k1 k2 f . f [k1 i] [(growl (s❡❧ i.❢❴r❡❢))∧ (k2 i)]
8 Π1 = λa b.a and Π2 = λa b.b are the first and the second projection respectively.
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To combine our more complex logical forms, we require a new binder rule:
JS1 . S2K = λ i k1 k2 f .JS1K i (λ i
′.JS2K i
′ k1 k2Π1) (λ i
′.JS2K i
′ k1 k2Π2) f(30)
To simplify, we interpret our examples with empty environments (❡♠♣t② =
{♠❴r❡❢ = ♥✐❧; ❜❛s❡ = ⊤; ❢❴r❡❢ = ♥✐❧}), trivial continuations (T = λ i.⊤). Conjunc-
tion of the two components (❈♦♥❥= λb1b2.b1∧b2) yields the type t. This yields:
Jt0 . t1K ❡♠♣t② T T ❈♦♥❥= [♦(⊤⇒ (∃x.(wolf x)∧ ((enter x)
∧ ((((wolf x)∧ (enter x))
⇒ (growl (s❡❧ ((x :: ♥✐❧)∪♥✐❧))))))))]∧⊤
Jt0 . t2K ❡♠♣t② T T ❈♦♥❥= [♦(⊤⇒ (∃x.(wolf x)∧ ((enter x)∧⊤)))]
∧ [growl (s❡❧ ♥✐❧)]
In the first case, the s❡❧ function has access to x, so (16), represented by t0.t1, is
predicted to be OK, but (17), represented by t0.t2, is predicted to be bad, because x
is not part of the accessible environment. To illustrate the importance of pronouns
within modal environments selecting from both modal and factual contexts, consider
again (18).
(18) A wolf is outside. He might eat you.
The first indicative sentence yields upon β reduction:
(31) λ i k1 k2 f .∃x. f [k1{i ✇✐t❤ ❢❴r❡❢ = x :: i.❢❴r❡❢}][(wolf x) ∧ ((Outside x) ∧
(k2 {i ✇✐t❤ ❢❴r❡❢ = x :: i.❢❴r❡❢}))]
Now integrating the modalized second sentence, we get:
(32) ∃x.[♦(⊤⇒ (eat you (s❡❧ ♥✐❧∪ (x :: ♥✐❧))))]∧ [(wolf x)∧ ((Outside x))]
And this is just what we want.
Exploiting a compositional analysis of counterfactuals (Asher & McCready
2007), our approach can also treat anaphoric links across counterfactuals:9
(34) If I had bought a refrigerator, I wouldn’t know what to do with it.
9 The present formalism does not suffice to handle examples with negation like
(33) I didn’t buy a refrigerator. I wouldn’t know what to do with it.
We follow Asher & McCready’s (2007) explanation in terms of discourse structure.
14
A Montagovian Treatment of Modal Subordination
3.2.4 Putting Everything Together
Modal subordination phenomena of Veltman’s observations show that factual infor-
mation is accessible to modalized continuations. With a slight abuse of notation (to
avoid even longer λ -terms), we make a factual sentence update the world context.
This suffices to capture Veltman modalities.10
So we now add to the context a field t❤❡♦r② to the context that will contain the
theory under construction which is tested as in Section 3.1.1 and we have
(35) γ
∆
= {♠❴r❡❢ : γ ′; ❜❛s❡ : t; ❢❴r❡❢ : γ ′; t❤❡♦r② : ❚❤❡♦r②}
Our final lexical entry for might is this:
JcmightK = λvs.λ i k1 k2 f .(λP.(❚❊❙❚ P) i.t❤❡♦r②
(λ i′ o′1 o
′
2 f
′. f ′(♦(i′.❜❛s❡⇒ (P i′ o′1 o
′
2 Pi1))))) (v s) i k1 k2 f
(36)
We have now captured our two types of context sensitivity for epistemic modals
within a unified framework, revealing the power of the CS approach. We’ve added
Veltman style modalities in conservative fashion to the externally static but internally
dynamic modalities needed to capture MS. We’ve also shown how the choice of
lexical entries and binder rules determine features of modal contexts.
4 Attitude dynamics
Modal subordination also occurs between pairs of attitude reports involving one or
more cognitive agents. Consider:
(37) Sam wants to marry an Italian. He hopes she will be rich.
(38) Hob thinks a witch has blighted his mare, and Nob thinks she has given his
cow warts.
CS is flexible enough to allow lexical entries inducing a wide scope reading for
the existential quantifier over unembedded modalities for MS. The intuitive truth
conditions for (37) and (38) require such modal independence. In (37) Sam doesn’t
want to hope that his Italian is rich—he simply hopes that she will be rich. Similarly,
(38) is not intuitively a report about what Hob believes about Nob or vice-versa.
The wide-scope strategy yields the following for (38), given an empty left context
and trivial continuation:
(39) ∃x (Bh(witch(x)∧blighted ...(x))∧Bn(gave warts...(s❡❧ ((x :: ♥✐❧)))))
10 We ignore here some further subtleties, like those explored in (Asher & McCready 2007).
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The truth of (39) problematically requires that there is an object in the world of
evaluation that is a witch in all of Hob and Nob’s belief worlds. The witch could be
entirely a figment of Hob and Nob’s imagination. We don’t want the truth conditions
of such reports to rest on substantive assumptions about the metaphysics of modality.
(Asher 1987) provided the first dynamic treatment of such examples. He ex-
ploited the contents of DRSs as sets of world assignment pairs (as Frank & Kamp
would do later for modal subordination), and coordinated the interpretations of two
attitude descriptions by constraining the proper embeddings of each to agree on
assignments to certain pairs of discourse referents. On such an approach, a witch
in (38) was treated introducing material only within the scope of the belief opera-
tor;various possible witches could be the value of this variable or discourse referent
under the coordinated assignments. The Hob-Nob examples, like the MS exam-
ples, showed the peculiarities of the logical framework of DRT in which discourse
referents have a kind of hybrid status, somewhere between bound and free variables.
To capture Asher’s (1987)’s interpretation of (38) but the curious logical status
of the discourse referents in DRT, we propose that the truth conditions of (38) entail
Hob and Nob’s sharing of an individual concept. Without going into details (though
see (Asher 2010)), the story exploits coercion and our ❚❊❙❚ operator of Section 3.
The pronoun in the second sentence presupposes the presence of an antecedent of the
appropriate type. Like other presuppositional triggers, the pronoun places a ❚❊❙❚ on
the antecedent context that there be an antecedent of the appropriate type in the left
context. Given our interpretive assumptions, this is not the case. Thus, the ❚❊❙❚ fails.
But the semantics of the pronoun also licenses an accommodation mechanism for the
exception, whereupon the antecedent changes its type from e to s → e, the type of
an individual concept.11 To treat the exception, we then redo the entire computation
having lifted the type of the indefinite to a quantifier over individual concepts.
To treat the exception case for the ❚❊❙❚ properly, we must precisify the particular
kind of individual concept at issue. The intuitive truth conditions of (38) dictate that
we need to ensure that the extension of the concept in Nob’s belief worlds and the
extension of the concept in Hob’s worlds are such that: if witch A blighted Hob’s
mare in a Hob belief world, then at least some of the belief worlds of Nob will have
witch A giving his cow warts; and all of Nob’s belief worlds, anyone who gave Nob’s
cow warts is a witch who blighted Hob’s mare in one of Hob’s belief worlds. This
is what the coordinated dependencies of Asher (1987) captures. This will require a
more complex binder rule making special use of the modal continuation.
TY2, with an added basic type for worlds, proves useful for treating the exception
11 We can imagine the same sort of test mechanism to be triggered not only because the context fails
the ❚❊❙❚ for semantic reasons, as here, but also for pragmatic reasons, as in the famous paycheck
sentences— the man who gave his paycheck to his wife was wiser than the one who gave it to his
mistress.
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to the ❚❊❙❚. In the language of TY2, roughly all predicates that were n-ary become
n+ 1-ary with the addition of a world parameter. The exception rule forces the
evaluation of the concept in Nob’s belief worlds to be the same the extension of the
concept in some one of Hob’s belief worlds. The end result is this:
λw.∃xs→e(∀w′ ∈Bh,w(witch(x(w
′),w′)∧blighted-horse(x(w′),w′)
∧∃w1 ∈Bn,wx(w1) = x(w
′)
∧∀w′′ ∈Bn,w(gave-warts(x(w
′′),w′′)∧∃w′′′ ∈Bh,wx(w
′′′) = x(w′′))))
Thus, CS proves very useful in the analysis of dependencies between modalities and
between modal and factual information.
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